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“SPANNING POLICYMAKING SILOS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: WHEN GLOBAL CITIES
ARE COASTAL CITIES TOO”
ABSTRACT
An obvious but grossly understated realization of urban policymaking is that
global cities are mostly found in the coastal zone. This is true worldwide but it is
especially characteristic of American global cities, where virtually all are found in coastal
areas. According to NOAA, 53 percent of the U.S. population lives in the coastal zone
and 40 percent of the coastal population live in global cities. This reality poses an
uncomfortable truth about a basic conflict between managing global city growth and the
sustainability of coastal resources. The former is often seen as the ultimate achievement
of a “new political culture,” while the latter refers to the most complex, delicate and
interdependent sub-ecology on earth. As a result, American global cities exist today with
a profound sense of discordant duality.
As global cities, they are known for their inspiring built environments where art
meets function and for their centrality in the world economy. Most are distinguished as
world “gateways” harboring major airports and “load-center” seaports. They also serve as
command centers for managing world commerce, as the nexus of multi-cultural
immersion, as world research crucibles, and as world stages for art and entertainment.
As coastal cities, they are associated with the beauty of a coastal habitat and their
proximity and access to the open sea. The bays, wetlands and shorelines draw people to
observe what happens when the sea meets the land. But a less conspicuous view is of the
city overlaid on a “coastal zone” biologists see as a highly productive nursery of life for
land and marine organisms but subject to intense and growing human population
pressures.
Although much of the American population chooses to live in coastal regions
because of their rich biodiversity, and in global cities because of the robust employment
and lifestyle opportunities, the duality does not always mix well in producing sustainable
outcomes. The paper develops the metrics for this duality and identifies two principal
contributors to it: the concentration of foreign trade through global-city seaports and the
accelerated activity levels and mobility needs of a global professional managerial class.
But the paper goes further by also focusing on the piecemeal public-policy
process as the source of concern for sustainability, especially in managing transportation,
economic development, migration, CO2 emissions, pollution and species extinction.
Specifically, global-city outcomes have often appeared to be driven by a “silo effect” (the
dysfunctional segregation of policy disciplines often caused by differences in ideology,
scientific fragmentation, and professional misunderstanding that limit the ability of one
discipline to sufficiently interact with another).
The significant management challenge, therefore, is about how the policy process
might be amended and restructured in light of the duality. This paper addresses a need to
manage the duality by producing new intergovernmental instruments for spanning the
policy silos. It specifically proposes a multiple-perspectives approach involving
interdisciplinary team policymaking and other supporting institutional arrangements.
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“SPANNING POLICYMAKING SILOS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: WHEN GLOBAL CITIES ARE
COASTAL CITIES TOO”
For more than a generation, researchers in urban studies have bemoaned the fact
that the United States has failed to produce a comprehensive national urban policy which
would bring together the study of disparate urban policy issues and their
interdependencies. This concern continues, for example, with Brookings’ recent call to
establish a holistic and synergistic framework it calls “Metro Policy” (Brookings, 2008;
Katz, Muro and Bradley, 2009). Nevertheless, the fragmentation of urban policymaking
and the lack of an integrating mechanism remain elusive and intransigent, especially
regarding holistic or systemic problems.
In part, this is because the customary mindset on cities associates policy solutions
with individual urban issues (e.g., housing, crime, energy, pollution, arts and
entertainment) rather than a holistic picture of a city’s reciprocal relationships. The
mindset is further reinforced by the relentless parochial nature of urban thinking and
prognosticating done by disparate clusters of scholars and policymakers known as
“policy silos.” No where are the fallout and risks from this parochial approach greater
than in American global cities. It is in these few metropolises where principal
connectivity to the global economy exists and where the largest collision between human
habitation and the natural ecology are likely occurring. This is magnified by the fact that
global cities are coastal cities too.
In the United States, only a few coastal cities are global cities, but virtually all
global cities are coastal cities. This may be due in part to historical circumstance. For,
example, most eastern U.S. global cities of the present trace their origins to the
colonization period where they emerged as mercantile centers of wealth and power and as
transshipment points in a far reaching web of maritime trading routes. The same can be
said for certain west coast cities during the westward expansion. Even though much has
happened in the last 150 years that weakens the maritime connection to urban
development, most of the power and socioeconomic complexity acquired in those earlier
periods gave these cities enduring advantages over great but newer cities that had no
maritime connection. Coastal cities like New York and Los Angeles are frequently
distinguished as more central world cities than are interior cities such as Denver and
Dallas.
Beyond their historical origins, such world cities exist today with a profound
sense of duality. As coastal cities, they are known for the beauty of their coastal resources
and their proximity and access to the open sea. The bays, wetlands and shorelines draw
people to observe what happens when the sea meets the land. Beside the obvious human
activities of urban life, the city is overlaid on a “coastal zone” viewed by biologists as the
nursery of life for as much as 90 percent of land and marine organisms.
As global cities, they are known for their inspiring built environments where art
meets function and for their centrality in the world economy. Most are distinguished as
global “gateways” harboring major airports and “load-center” seaports. Global cities also
serve as command and control centers for managing world commerce, as the nexus of
multi-cultural immersion, as major centers for research and as world stages for art and
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entertainment. Hence, these cities hold the dual distinction of being at the top of the
global urban hierarchy and of being located in delicate coastal ecosystems subject to
intense human population pressures.
Although much of the U.S. population chooses to live in coastal regions because
of their rich and complex resources, and in global cities because of the robust
employment and lifestyle opportunities, the duality does not always align well in
producing sustainable outcomes. This paper concentrates on the public policy challenge
of managing the duality with particular reference to potential consequences on urban
activity, development and environmental quality in the coastal zone.
What is a “Global City”?
Since Hall’s brilliant treatise (1966), the term “global city” has come to connote
what nearly everyone refers to as a unique urban habitat acting as a portal and stage for
world connectivity. It bestows an image that is contemporary, international, multicultural, “wired,” cosmopolitan, congested, polarizing and commanding geographicallyboundless spheres of influence. However, until recent work by Boschken (2008), the term
has not been widely understood as a collective vision that empirically sets apart the
global city as a complex system for analyzing policy issues related to it. With a focus
principally on the American experience, the work addressed the shortcoming by
developing a multiple-perspectives approach using the lens of developmental policy
theory. It found the global city to be a reflection of historical stages that evolved through
interdependencies between globalization pressures and intra-urban developmental
initiative.
In search of a collective understanding of the multi-dimensional global city,
history informs us that the last half of the 20th century revealed a vastly changed world
order based on a contemporary form of globalization. Characterizing this post-WWII
reordering as a developmental experience within the city, Clark (2004, p.293) says
contemporary globalization appears to have been a cumulative process involving a threestage, partly-overlapping sequence of economic, sociological and political
transformations. Moreover, as world leader of many new trends during this period, the
U.S. appeared to represent the focal point of these global transformations. The
developmental impacts of evolutionary globalization on the American urban setting
become more apparent upon closer examination.
Probably ignited by post-war reconstruction economics, the first stage of
transformation (especially since 1960) involved a geographic separation of goodsproduction from locations of product-consumption. For sure, self-contained regional
economies (i.e., containing both producers and consumers of a product) had diminished
in importance in the U.S. and elsewhere in the industrializing world by mid-20th Century.
As a new dimension, however, the separation of production and consumption had taken
on immense international proportions with the emergence of “offshore” sourcing of
goods and the creation of global markets. Through a highly competitive system of remote
multinational production sites controlled and coordinated by a new fiscal and logistical
command structure, this economic stage originally appeared as a concentration of
demand on American soil offset by a global dispersion of supply (albeit skewed to the
Pacific Rim).
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Based on a premise that products could be made anywhere in the world without
significant regard for per-unit transportation costs, it was a stage underscored by a
massive shift toward international trade flows made possible by an American-invented
“container revolution” in global shipping (Boschken, 1988; Boschken, 1998). It was also
underscored by a concentration in strategic cities of production-service firms needed to
control the logistics of these flows from and among dispersed manufacturing sites
worldwide to markets mostly in North America and Europe (Sassen, 2001; Thrift, 1994;
Friedmann, 1986).
Because of globalization’s initial dependency on the economics of maritime trade,
it was probably this first stage that solidified the positioning of the global city as a coastal
city. Nevertheless, the economic stage eventually yielded some of its visibility to a
second transformation sparked by a revolution in information and media technologies
(especially since 1980). It materialized in the rise of a symbols-driven cosmopolitan
consumption, which concentrated on urban entertainment venues and post-modern
interest in cultural immersion. The “global lifestyle” had arrived and brought with it
mushrooming demand for culturally-significant goods from all over the world and a host
of “quality-of-life” urban services, as well as the free movement of foreigners,
information and ethnic lifestyles across national borders (Clark, 2001).
Media-driven celebrations and focus on internet applications, consumption of
wares at international festivals, appreciation for ethnic foods and gourmet restaurant
districts, and the presentation of “world-event” theatrical performances, music concerts
and art exhibits became standard preoccupations of many Americans (Clark, 2004; Short,
Kim and Wells, 1996). So also did “buying trips” by global-aspiring folks to such
prominent destinations as New York, Los Angeles, Toronto, London, Paris, Rome,
Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore and Mumbai, where at least a portion of the
motive has been cultural immersion.
Arguing that “amenities are critical for most urban processes,” Clark emphasizes
“this is news since most past theories [of developmental policy] stress work and markets,
rather than consumption and amenities” (2002, p. 1). Although a coastal setting may not
be essential to the character of this stage, the establishment of global cities in coastal
zones during the first stage probably added important momentum to defining the global
lifestyle with a coastal feel.
More recently, these two stages appear to have given ground to a third (especially
since 1990) involving a realignment of urban politics, said to be founded on a “new
political culture” of fiscal conservatism and social liberalism (Clark and HoffmanMartinot, 1998). Particularly evident in a few select cities, politically-important
constituencies hold heightened aspirations for world-class status for their urban habitat
that bestows membership in a global interaction spanning traditional political boundaries.
Being economically conservative, this political culture tends to promote a
realignment of public policymaking priorities. It tends to favor “productive”
developmental expenditures driven by global forces of consumption and it tends to deemphasize traditional welfare programs that might otherwise sustain blight and
perpetuate the dysfunctional lifestyles of an urban underclass (Abu-Lughod, 1999;
McKenzie, 2001). Moreover, the realignment of priorities is accompanied by decline of
hierarchical political organizations, traditional bureaucracies and clientelism (Clark and
Hoffmann-Martinot, 1998; Hawes, 2000; Bishop, 2000; Thrift, 1994).
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In this spirit of economic development, political support is often thrown to publicprivate partnerships that plan and carve out post-industrial habitats from economicallydeclining urban cores. Evidence of such consortiums at work is found, for example, in the
comprehensive development of new multi-purpose central districts, having generously
landscaped promenades threading together artfully-designed high rise business towers
with entertainment and residential centers, all made regionally accessible by stylish,
technologically-advanced rail transit. Satisfying to a productivity-minded fiscal
conservative, the reclaiming of core cities in this way is said to reflect a forward-looking
constituency determined to advance the global position of its city, competitively,
symbolically and by appearance.
Being socially liberal, these same constituents also express deep commitment to
their own personal freedoms and exhibit greater tolerance for and appreciation of foreign
or ethnic cultures and variant lifestyles. As a consequence, many cities have developed
social programs which invite and encourage the growth and integration of a multi-cultural
community. A new integration is being formed by “hybridizing” (Tajbakhsh, 2001) the
metropolitan area’s legislative bodies, business leadership, community organizations, and
public gathering places. Unlike earlier re-gentrification, a new paradigm of ethnic and
lifestyle diversity seems to have fostered a multi-cultural community model which
enlarges civil liberties and international experiences for most of those choosing to be
immersed in it.
From a developmental standpoint, the three-stage transformations point to a
fundamental rethinking of the role of cities as connector nodes in a multi-nucleated
global network of economic, sociocultural and political interaction and exchange. Even
more pointedly, it leads us to expect the resulting global city to be more than a purely
techno-economic outcome and more than a passive participant in a corporate-driven
macro-world system. As seen both in attributes of disparate urban activities and in
multiple overlapping patterns of inter-urban relationships, the global city seems to exhibit
several distinguishing dimensions, and be more complex in its makeup and influence than
either a linear information-processing model or the traditional hub-and-spoke
configuration would predict.
As caldrons of contemporary globalization, global cities today exhibit a
developmental process now spanning 50 years and paralleling that of the three-stage
transformations. They have emerged incrementally by brewing and incorporating
numerous economic, social and political forces of a persistent post-WWII globalizing
world. They also emerged under American influence since the transformations followed a
certain temporal and geographic ordering that, until recently, placed the U.S. at the center
of contemporary global-city design and imitation.
Hence, in a highly discriminating fashion, “globalization can be deconstructed in
terms of the strategic sites where global processes materialize” (Sassen, 1998, p. 392) and
are grounded in what “geographically-situated people do” (Smith and Timberlake, 2001,
p. 1657). As the differential result of both external globalizing demands and internal
developmental policy responses, those that are global cities appear as strategic platforms
of world connectivity.
As a cautionary note, however, most cities may have some global attributes and
connectivity, but “platform” cities would be expected to contain a comprehensive set of
dimensions reflective of the economic, social, and political components of the post-war
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period of tri-stage globalization. Many metropolitan areas, for example, may appear
global by their physical appearance, but this is often the result of mimicking urban
redevelopment spurred on by stage-3 influences of political culture rather than long
matriculation of the precursor attributes found in the first two stages of globalization.
With a focus on these components, Boschken’s work (2008) carves from the
literature seven distinguishing dimensions which are examined using a sample of 53 large
U.S. cities (using the 2000 Census’ definition for “urbanized areas”). The dimensions are
statistically merged into a single factor which in turn is used to drive a K-means cluster
analysis that separates out global from minimally-global cities.
The dimensions identified as distinguishing a global city include [1] scale of the
urban area where size appears to provide a critical mass necessary for holistic global
functioning. The list also includes the global city as [2] an agglomerated command and
control center for the global economy (Taylor, 2004; Sassen, 2001), [3] a world
entertainment stage providing symbols, innovations and standards for emulation globally
(Clark, 2004; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006), [4] a non-corporate world research crucible
composed of an agglomeration of university, government and tax-exempt organizations
providing knowledge resources to a global village of policymakers (Brint, 2001), [5] a
center of multiculturalism existing as a nexus for global social exchange (Sassen, 2004;
Nyman, 1996), [6] a global gateway for international transportation including air
passenger travel (Derudder and Witlox, 2005) and maritime trade (Boschken, 1988), and
the city as [7] an integrated and accessible built environment augmented by effective railbased mobility systems (Boschken, 2002). Of significance, having a high concentration
of manufacturing is not a distinguishing feature of global cities.
Using the K-means clustering algorithm driven by a factor of the 7 dimensions,
the results show that two metros (New York and Los Angeles), along with six other
slightly lower-scoring metros (Washington, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Miami, and
Philadelphia, respectively), to be distinctly separate from the remaining 45 in the U.S.
sample (statistical significance = .000). For the most part, the difference between the two
top global cities of New York and Los Angeles and the remaining six is explained by
specialization. For example, the data show that Boston and Washington stand out as
specialists in the command center function and as crucibles of research, and have worldclass infrastructures that include transit and a global gateway (airport only for
Washington). By comparison, Philadelphia provides exceptional global-city support
systems (especially transit) but is not as distinguished in global platform functions
(command center, entertainment and research).
The San Francisco/Oakland area specializes in command-center functions and has
a strong multicultural presence consistent with “uneven globalization” having an Asian or
Pacific Rim emphasis. It also has a well known rail transit system, global-gateway airport
(San Francisco) and containerized load-center seaport (Oakland). Miami specializes as a
global gateway and maintains a strong multicultural presence skewed toward its
Caribbean and Latin American ties, but is not distinguished by platform functions.
As presented, the dimensions may be categorized into two types of urban artifacts.
First, the global city contains a critical mass of central functions and infrastructure
associated with a world assemblage of “parts.” These interactive parts are engaged in the
co-production of applied knowledge, symbolic creations, capital management, policy
coordination, transaction control, logistics and mobility. Second, the global city exhibits
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the “on-site” cultural and political content of globalization provided by an urban milieu
of scientific research and education, media and entertainment, and multicultural
amenities. Referring to these as dual identities of function and content, Nyman (1996)
argues the global city is about both “the city in the world” and “the world in the city” (p.
6).
To more fully appreciate the potential synergy of these seven dimensions, one
also might conceive of them as holistically interacting in a way that simultaneously
imprints the momentum and routine of the world stage onto an urbanite’s daily activities
and consciousness. Global cities possess a “complex and multifaceted” character (Sassen,
2001, p. 351) which immerses urbanites in a different comprehensiveness than found in
cities exhibiting minimal global attributes. Moreover, these cities have experienced “a
renaissance as places of consumption, not production” (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006, p.
1276).Therefore, one would expect that how urbanites interact, what activities they
pursue and what consumption patterns they exhibit might be driven by or determined
within the context of a city’s global centrality and connectivity.
The unmistakable reality of global cities is their immense scale, energyconsuming activity levels, culture-bearing ritualism, corporate protocols, and
transterritorial dominance across numerous levels of consciousness. As Figure 1
indicates, eight U.S. cities were identified in Boschken’s (2008) cluster analysis as global
cities. Each is in rank order according to the number of global-city dimensions exhibited,
which ranged from three to seven. By contrast, the remaining 45 U.S. cities in the sample
averaged zero global city dimensions. In terms of population, these eight global cities
combined represent 20 percent of the 2000 U.S. population, and the percentage figure is
growing disproportionately relative to the more than 200 other large urbanized areas
defined by the Census.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Global Cities Are Coastal Cities
Beyond the seven global-city dimensions, a coincident characteristic of all eight
U.S. global cities shown in Figure 1 is that they are coastal cities too. That is, they exist
within 60 miles of a coastline which NOAA (2004) defines as the coastal zone (Chicago
is located on a fresh-water coast as is Canada’s Toronto). They contain the nation’s
largest working harbors, exist in the midst of major wetlands, and typically have
extended resort beaches and developed waterfronts containing high rise residences, parks
and commercial ventures. As such, all have coastal access and dependencies that make
their environs subject to very different and more intense impacts than those of other
smaller coastal enclaves and non-coastal cities.
Speaking of concentration pressure alone, the combined population of these eight
coastal cities represent 40 percent of the 153 million people who reside in U.S. coastal
counties (NOAA, 2004).These statistics belie the more common image of the coastal city
as a bucolic, pastoral, cleansing setting of a town along a stretch of undisturbed pristine
beach. Compare Manhattan with Cape Cod; Los Angeles with Mendocino. In terms of
the proportion of population in the coastal zone, or relative amounts of point and nonpoint source pollution, or contribution to GDP, the eight global cities are the greater
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representatives of the coastal city in all parts of maritime America except perhaps the
Gulf.
What this suggests for the coastal zone is a greater and more concentrated risk to
coastal sustainability. From a common-pool perspective, a “free rider” problem in global
cities probably poses greater obstacles to sustainability than in less-global cities because
of the greater collective and synergistic magnitude of corporate and individual “overuse
[of resources] without concern for the negative effects on others, and a lack of
contributed resources for maintaining and improving the common pool resource itself”
(Ostrom, et al, 1999, p. 279). Moreover, the reach of global cities’ physical,
socioeconomic, and political impacts typically extend well beyond the metropolitan
boundaries and coastal shorelines that define them geographically.
Herein lies the dilemma (some would say discontinuity), between the man-made
built environment and the natural ecology (Turner, Subak and Adger, 1996; Marshall,
2005; Baird, 2008). Environmentally, the coastal zone is a particularly fragile and
delicate ecology made up of multiple webs of terrestrial and aquatic interdependencies.
There are no other ecological systems on earth that have the degree of complexity and
interaction of subsystems as that found along the coast, its estuaries and harbors, saline
wetlands and river deltas. Since the vast majority of all living organisms have their
gestational origins within the coastal zone, the issues of sustainability and biodiversity
should be apparent as major global-city policymaking considerations.
Yet, the two worlds – one human and urbane, the other natural and biodiverse –
are seemingly irreconcilable. When the coastal city is a global city that imprints
momentum and routine of the world stage onto an urbanite’s daily activities and
consciousness, many consequences are focused on the ecological systems of the coastal
zone. Although many observers view cities on the coast in concert with a coastal
landscape, global cities seem to simply overwhelm a coastal ecological character.
Two Agents of Consequence
To address the influences underlying this dilemma, one might ask: Are American
global cities inherently coastal? Are there critical agents or forces in play that tend to be
of only marginal significance in less-global cities? Would such agents be important
enough to form a basis for singling out global cities in policymaking reforms? Some
answers may be found in the requirements of globalization and in the socioeconomic
source of lifestyles found in global cities.
1. Load-Center Seaports. Globalization is rooted in the ability to move huge
tonnage of goods swiftly around the world at a scale and efficiency that makes the cost
per unit of transportation minimal or insignificant in the final cost of goods sold. Such an
achievement allows goods to be produced anywhere in the world and sold anywhere in
the world, and allows producers to compete on the basis of a good’s quality and
manufacturing cost regardless of their geographical location. To make this possible,
transformational technologies in ship design and at seaport terminals emerged in the
1970s that revolutionized maritime shipping by placing goods in large salt-resistant metal
containers, the principal means by which international goods are shipped (Boschken,
1988).
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At the core of this foreign-trade shipping revolution was the maritime seaport
which acts as a transshipment point in a world system of logistics, finance and control. Its
location in the coastal zone provides not only the ability to transfer goods across the sealand barrier but also provides a host of other functions including container consolidation
and redirection, insurance and documentation, security, global finance, and other
activities of the command function of the global economy. Hence, the pressures emerging
from globalization required the agglomeration and centralization of command and
business-service functions around large containerized seaports.
Solidifying their presence in coastal areas, cities that had both large containerized
ports called “load centers” and global command-center platforms in place by the 1980s
were able to emerge as transshipment centers of the global economy. This type of seaport
now dominates global trade because they are few in number and allow ships to on- and
off-load their entire cargoes at one stop. As shown in Figure 2, load centers are a
principal element connecting global cities to coastal areas. Five of the eight global cities
identified by Boschken (2008) are recognized as having load-center ports. Boston and
Chicago ports have a smaller presence and Washington, DC has none. Combined, the
eight global cities account for 61 percent of all containerized cargo entering the U.S. Out
of more than 200 other large American cities, three cities not included in the global-city
cluster (Houston, Norfolk and Seattle) account for most of the remaining foreign
container traffic. Seaports, therefore, matter in determining and perpetuating global cities.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
2. An Upper Middle Class Lifestyle (Genre). Some might argue that urban
impacts on the coastal zone are greater for global cities simply because they rank among
the largest in size (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006). Even so, there also may be an agent that
delivers even higher and broader impacts by stimulating greater human activity per
capita. Global cities are a magnet for lifestyles that engender exceptionally high activity
and intra-urban mobility levels.
Not to be confused with activities of a stealth upper class, these “on-the- go”
lifestyles seem to coalesce around a highly visible presence of upper middle class (UMC)
– a socioeconomic status (SES) made up of well-educated and well-paid professionals
and their cosmopolitan and urbane families (Boschken, 2002). Reich (1992) refers to
them as “symbolic analysts” engaged in what Brint (2001) calls a “scientific-professional
knowledge economy.”
Both on and off the job, UMC individuals tend to envision their opportunities,
movements and mobility in the context of an enriched “urban field”, described by
Friedmann and Miller (1965) as the mental construct of a holistic metropolitan area
containing spatially noncontiguous but functionally integrated geography (as contrasted
with a traditional finitely-bounded spoke-and-hub configuration). Perhaps unaware of
their transterritorial movements, the UMC seem to give little thought to their cross-town
commuting to activities and events that are spatially distanced and remote from one
another.
Why is such a group more active in an urban setting? In addition to UMC
professional commuting to work, they also are likely to have an “agglomeration” of faceto-face meetings (Porter, 1998) spread out in the urban field (beyond their offices) that
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require high vehicle use. Consistent with this characterization is a non-parametric travel
pattern involving professional use of other offices, conference facilities, restaurants,
theatre, golf, and the airport. Since the UMC have proportionally higher dualbreadwinner families (often both professionally employed) than the median family, their
work-related commuting habits may be magnified further.
Add to this the high-aspiring UMC family commuting with children to the best
college-prep schools across town, meeting for a game of tennis at the club, after-school
and weekend activities for the children, and evening events outside of work. Further, add
myriad activities (jobs and commuting) of others induced by UMC consumption demands
for residential maid service and landscapers, private social and recreational clubs, limo
and retail pick-up & delivery services, dental and cosmetic maintenance, etc.
Of consequence, the UMC are more evident in global cities than elsewhere
(Boschken, 2003). There are two reasons for this concentration. First, the nature of a
global city in providing a platform for globally-connected organizations (i.e.,
corporations engaged in command-center functions, non-corporate global research
institutions, world entertainment and media firms) creates a unique agglomeration of
postindustrial (knowledge-processing) employment opportunities, contacts and
exchanges for highly educated professionals in global business, academia, and
entertainment and media (the latter of which includes artists, authors, playwrights, actors,
electronic gurus, and entertainment managers). Furthermore, as a genre, the UMC
imparts a “systemic power” (Stone, 1980) over the activity scene by providing a standard
of behavior that some of the larger general urban population may emulate as well.
Second, global cities are gateways of travel and temporary stays for global
business, research and entertainment purposes, and, therefore, attract a larger mix of
highly-educated professionals from throughout the world than non-global cities. Like
their indigenous counterparts, these “foreign” UMC are inclined to engage in heightened
levels of activity and seek greater mobility throughout the city. This additional contingent
(often with families in tow) further magnifies a UMC presence in the global-city “scene.”
An extended discussion of this connection between the global city and the UMC
is found in a variety of research, including that of Sassen, (2001), Brint (2001), Clark and
Hoffman-Martinot (1998), Boschken (2002), and Florida (2001). Additionally, there is
some empirical evidence supporting the association of UMC with global cities. In
Boschken’s 53-cities sample (2008) used here, correlations of the 7-dimension globalcity factor with (1) the percent professional UMC in a city and (2) the number of
international passengers passing through city airports in 2000 are significant at the .01
level (r sq = .40 and .87, respectively). Although the correlations do not mean UMC are
found only in global cities, they do suggest a significant affinity of UMC for global cities.
Nevertheless, the empirical data also appear to support the argument that
heightened levels of UMC activity in the global city has consequences on the human
habitat and environment beyond what city size alone would predict. For example, Figure
3 shows significant correlations between three UMC global-platform activity areas (as
measured by command-center and institutional research employment and entertainment
consumption) and pressures on specific urban mobility modes.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
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With regard to public transit consumption, the greater the UMC global-platform
activities, the greater the per capita consumption of public transit (r sq = .79, .69, .59,
respectively). Higher levels of urban traffic congestion are also consistent with higher
UMC platform activity levels (r sq = .50, .42, .54, respectively). From a global travel
perspective, greater numbers of international airport passengers is highly associated with
higher UMC platform activities (r sq = .76, .42, .84, respectively). Even though parts of
global platform activities are found to some extent in cities other than the eight identified
by Boschken (2008) as global, the data suggest these three indicators of urban mobility
pressures are significantly related to specific areas of UMC activities, the highest
concentrations of which are found in global cities.
Although this circumstantial evidence seems to indicate global cities may be
disproportionately influenced by a UMC genre, how do we confirm that its comparatively
larger impacts are mostly unique to global cities? One possible answer may be found in
results produced by a K-means cluster analysis using three separate drivers including percapita transit consumption, traffic congestion and international travel flows. The results
are reported in Figure 4 and show global cities to dominate clusters having the highest
traces of UMC-induced mobility pressures.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In the case of per capita transit consumption, 75 percent of global cities (Los
Angeles and Miami were excluded by the algorithm) appear in the highest consumption
cluster containing 7 cities (of which Honolulu is the only non-global city included).
Likewise, 75 percent of global cities (New York and Philadelphia were excluded) appear
in the highest traffic congestion cluster containing 15 cities. By comparison, only 27
percent of the remaining 45 cities are in this cluster. In the case of international airport
travel, all eight global cities are in the cluster of greatest concentration of international
passengers containing 14 cities. Only 13 percent of the remaining 45 cities are in this
cluster. Hence, beside global maritime trade, at least part of a global city’s heavier
footprint on the coastal zone also seems to be attributable to a UMC-induced lifestyle and
consequent high-mobility demands expressed across a global city’s urban field.
Cross-Silo Policy Challenges
Global cities are a special case in the American urban experience. In light of the
skewed configuration and momentum imparted by the three stages of contemporary
globalization, the eight global cities have evolved along a very different path than
America’s less-global cities. This path is characterized not just by centrality in a
corporate global economy but also by the enrichment of multiple other perspectives
regarding political culture, lifestyle and consumption, public regardingness and social
tolerance. This differential reality is reflected in Figure 5, which ranks and compares
Boschken’s 53-cities sample according to scores for the scaled 7-dimension global-city
factor. The eight urbanized areas identified as global cities by the k-means cluster
analysis stand apart. Only three others not included in the cluster (Atlanta, Dallas and
Houston) even approach the values of the 8 multi-dimensioned global cities.
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[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
This evidence suggests global cities are a special case not because of any single
dimension but because of their complex socioeconomic contents and interrelationships
represented by the seven dimensions. They are made more so by their wide-body and
heavy footprint on the coastal zone. Going forward, it seems hard to imagine a
spontaneous containment of population pressures and impacts associated with these eight
global cities (and probably global cities worldwide) that would change this picture.
Indeed, evidence points to more concentrated centrality. The load-center seaports
and gateway airports found within them are likely to experience continued concentration
of global trade flows and inter-cultural exchange. Regarding seaports, for example, this is
apparent in the recent deployment of “mega container ships” which are being used to
“muscle aside smaller players” (Miller, 2009). Likewise, with the command-center
platform and attendant amenities, the disproportional presence of a professional UMC
lifestyle (along with its characteristic consumption patterns, urban-field mobility,
entertainment-rich opportunities, and trendsetting influence on activity levels generally)
is likely to grow with continued emergence of globalization.
From a coastal zone perspective, global cities are also likely to be seen as
different from their less-global counterparts in the magnitude and complexity in which
they impact environmental quality, carrying capacity and biodiversity both landward and
seaward. One should expect greater incidence and concentrations in global cities (even on
a per capita basis) of such aggravated conditions as transportation congestion across the
urban field, harbor and coastal water pollution, solid waste leeching and chemical spills,
intractable toxic wastewater effluents, depleting water resources, acute air pollution and
global warming issues. Interactions among these sustainability problems will compound
themselves holistically as well. Moreover, if American global cities eventually morph
into vast coastal “mega-cities” as some have done worldwide, even more dire
consequences may be at stake (see, for example Douglass, 2000; Yusuf and Wu, 2002;
Monkkonen, et al, 2004).
The duality in this picture implies a co-evolution of the global city and its coastal
setting. Hence, in the face of dynamic reciprocal complexities, the policy problem is
about dual sustainability of a city’s competitive position in global socioeconomic and
cultural networks and maintenance of coastal ecology and biodiversity. For
policymaking, it means understanding sustainability not only in terms of a plethora of
socioeconomic and environmental factors, but also from the holistic nature of their web
of interdependencies.
In various combinations, these interdependencies and their cumulative sources
clearly exceed the perspectives of any existing policy silo (scientific discipline,
specialized public authority, functional city department or private interest) relevant to or
found within the global-city metropolitan area. The real issue, then, is that the current
scale at which policymaking is done does not match the scale of the dual sustainability
problem exhibited in global cities.
Like most American metropolitan areas, global cities are typically governed by a
highly balkanized and departmentalized set of policymakers that are spread among
general-function city and county governments, special districts, and regionalized
planning, development and regulatory agencies. In what Wildavsky called “a bias toward

12

federalism” (1979, Chap. 6), this non-centralized metropolitan system of “concurrent
government” consists of “separate but overlapping authorities” (Ostrom, 1989; Boschken,
1976) which provides a structure where public differences are mollified and the risks of
synoptic policymaking avoided by “mutual adjustment” (Braybrook and Lindblom, 1970;
Lindblom, 1965).
Yet, even with adequate public resources, technological innovations, “smart
growth” planning techniques, local global warming initiatives and the green revolution,
this non-centralized, silo-based policymaking apparatus does not speak to the need for a
mechanism scaled to the holistic dimensions of a global city and its intertwined coastal
impacts -- one that accounts for urban and environmental policymaking in a systemic
metropolitan context.
It is clear that a major breakdown in urban policymaking generally is due partly to
dysfunctions from the silo effect (Katz, Muro and Bradley, 2009; Batty, 2008; Shi and
Singh, 2003). But, what is specifically missing for global cities is a focus on policy
matters that fall beyond the purview of silos. What is missing is policymaking focused on
critical matters that are embedded in webs of complex interdependencies (primary,
secondary and nonlinear) but which are usually peripheral to the parochial purview of
functionally structured general government or specialized authorities making up the
balkanized authorities of a global-city metropolitan area.
What is needed to rectify this mismatch in scale is more difficult to say. However,
the outline of a reasoned solution seems to be appearing from a variety of perspectives
(see, for example, Katz, Muro and Bradley, 2009; Batty, 2008; Norgaard and Baer, 2005;
Ostrom, et al, 1999). Most of these seem to envision structural reform that doesn’t
replace the balkanized and reductionist policy apparatus but supplements it with a new
focus and authority based on understanding global cities as complex holistic systems.
For example, with regard to policy-relevant research, Norgaard and Baer argue
that “The structure in which most reductionist science has been generated is seen by
scientists as ‘natural,” indeed as ‘carving nature at its joints,’ but…it is more important to
look at the network of communication and learning across the proliferation of diverse
institutions in which science is now conducted than at the disciplines themselves” (2005,
p. 955). Such reform would make room in the metropolitan governance of global cities
for a purview over both systemic interactions and the larger holistic context
encompassing socioeconomic and environmental sustainability. It would match
policymaking with the scale and geographical reach entailed in the global city duality.
As complex systems, Batty contends all large cities have the earmarks of being
“emergent, far from equilibrium, requiring enormous energies to maintain themselves,
displaying patterns of inequality spawned through agglomeration and intense competition
for space, and saturated flow systems that use capacity in what appear to be barely
sustainable but paradoxically resilient networks” (2008, p. 769). Global cities in
particular are quintessential because of their unique 7 dimensions and coastal location
which create a complex situation of multiple systemic interactions across human and
biological communities. Global cities are the “elephants in the room” of metropolitan
policymaking.
What this possibly warrants is research on a new policymaking vehicle scaled to
the global city, having cross-silo policymaking authority and matching the dynamics and
momentum of the urban field with the coastal setting as a common-pool resource.
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Consistent with this argument is focus on a new level of governance that (1) corresponds
to the holistic complex interdependencies (implicit in the urban field and coastal
common-pool resources) and that (2) is separate from but interdependent with existing
balkanized authorities and silo-based policymaking bodies.
Global cities are more central to America’s national and international policy
interests than less-global cities and, some claim, than the 50 states as well (Katz, Muro
and Bradley, 2009). Historically, these interests have been understood in specific policy
areas such as transportation, housing, homeland security, education and health. But, the
federal interest here speaks to the global city as a complex system involving
interdependent pieces ranging across individual policy areas. With this distinction, it
should be clear that, the eight American global cities reflect the place and the moment for
the President and Congress to seize a unique and historic opportunity to forge a national
urban policy demonstrating how to organize a new policymaking vehicle around the
holistic city. Such a policy should identify the eight metropolitan areas by designating
each with individual federal status and a new apparatus for holistic and systemic policy
management.
Consistent with the above arguments, this apparatus should not further
institutionalize “an ossified network of specialized and balkanized agencies at a time
when most challenges require integrated solutions that ‘join’ up related areas” (Katz,
2009, p. 1). Instead, a federal role could be to create a process specific to the
circumstances of each global city and that brings together multiple perspectives focused
on systemic and cross-silo research and policymaking. As suggested in Figure 6, a federal
organic law governing global cities certainly might contain two principal elements.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
First, a bi-level apparatus could be established to treat global cities collectively as
a special domain in U.S. policy and individually in their unique policy contexts. The
collective-level agency, perhaps called the Federal Inter-Silo Research and Clearinghouse
Agency on Global Cities, would emphasize the “joining of expertise across scientific
[and policy] communities” into “collective processes of learning and understanding”
(Norgaard and Baer, 2005, p. 958). This structure and its collective processes might be
fashioned after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control (IPCC) which employs
an integrated matrix of networks representing multiple perspectives to reveal status and
connections among interacting factors.
Guided by a “philosophy of methodological pluralism” (Norgaard and Baer, 2005,
p. 957), this body should be constituted of scientists, social scientists, policy wonks, and
distinguished-citizens committed to interdisciplinary research and policy collaboration on
global cities as holistic systems. As an additional means to “transcend the disparate
nature of human understanding” (Norgaard and Baer, 2005, p. 959) and to lower access
costs (Ostrom, et al, 1999), the research panel could be augmented by a clearinghouse
function. This inter-silo entity, however, would not only act as a repository for global-city
research, but also have the capacity to pursue interests in scanning and arranging
information from across silos according to policy questions posed by different systemic
concerns (Dean, 2009) . An example is found in the case of medical research where silobound information is extracted and re-assembled by a “broker” searching across silos for
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interconnections pertaining to particular medical conditions having no currently
recognized solutions (see, for example, Marcus, 2009).
Informed by the collective, policy-relevant, cross-silo information generated by
the federal-level agency, the second level in the bi-level structure might consist of eight
global-city authorities that could be vested with the decisional authority to make and act
on systemic policy regarding the dynamic changes in individual global cities. Constituted
as eight intergovernmental subgroups, they could be charged with monitoring and making
policy concerning the holistic and dynamic attributes and interrelationships respective to
each global city as-a-whole. Specifically authorized to manage dual sustainability of
urban and coastal, it should not be confused however with the more limited role played
by such single-silo agencies as metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), which are
employed mostly for transportation and land use planning.
Second, for global cities, federal intergovernmental funding could be subvented
directly to the eight federally-designated global-city authorities. Under current
programmatic distributions, “federal governance fails to recognize the interconnectedness
of whole program areas…precluding integrated problem-solving” (Katz, Muro and
Bradley, 2009, p. 28-29). Likewise, principal funding for metropolitan areas currently is
often routed through the states, but could be redirected to the eight global-city authorities.
This would not eliminate a role for the states, but would encourage them to establish their
own distinct interest-defined funding. It also would eliminate the ability of states to
obstruct federal intention by holding up subventions bound for the global cities.
This brief outline of a new federal role in global-city policymaking is only
intended to extend the debate on how to address the dual sustainability with which the
most important U.S. cities have to contend. But, it also incidentally speaks to the idea that
worldwide, such cities have the same cross-silo problems in governing the systemic
interactions between urban field and coastal zone. From many policy perspectives, global
cities everywhere are essential and beneficial to the well being of human communities,
but policymaking needs to dwell more on the unmitigated dysfunctions and systemic
impacts they pose.
At the end of the day, policy solutions that simply result from an agglomeration of
individual “quasi-independent” policymaking bodies with focused or specialized
authority (adjudicated or not by mutual adjustment) are no longer sufficient for holistic
dynamics given our state of scientific knowledge about systemic relationships and their
multiple impacts. Co-evolutionary sustainability requires a new silo-spanning
complement to the existing structure that deals specifically with the systemic overlay of a
global city in the coastal zone. The scale of public policymaking needs to match the scale
of the problem.
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FIGURE 1
AMERICAN GLOBAL CITIES AND THEIR COASTAL CONNECTIVITY
53 U.S. Cities: K-Means Cluster Analysis, 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
COASTAL CITY FEATURES
CITY (rank order
Global-City
Population
Coastal Access
Other Coastal
by 7-dimension
Dimensions* (urbanized area
Connectivity
factor) _____________________in millions)_______________________________
New York
7
17,800
Harbor &
WTC &
Seaport
Waterfront
Los Angeles
6
11,790
Harbor &
Beaches &
Seaport
Wetlands
Chicago
5
8,308
Great Lake
Beaches &
& Seaway
Waterfront
Boston
5
4,034
Harbor &
Beaches &
Seaport
Wetlands
San Francisco/Oakland
4
4,016
Bay Harbor Beaches &
& Seaport
Wetlands
Washington, DC
3
3,933
River
Waterfront
Miami

3

4,919

Philadelphia

3

5,150

Combined Population of
8 U.S. Global Cities

-

59,950

Wetlands
& Seaport
Bay Harbor
& Seaport

Beaches &
Waterfront
Waterfront

Mean Figures of
45 Remaining Cities
0
1,524
_______________________________________________________________________
*For those cities within the global-city cluster, the number of dimensions in which they
scored as global cities ranged from 7 (for New York) to 3 (for Washington, Miami and
Philadelphia). By contrast, minimally-global cities appeared in only 0 to 2 dimensions
(80 percent of these scored on zero global-city dimensions).
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FIGURE 2
CENTRALITY OF GLOBAL–CITY SEAPORTS IN FOREIGN CARGO TRADE
Foreign Containerized Maritime Cargo at Seaports, 2000 Data
CITY (rank order
TRANSSHIPMENT CENTRALITY IN GLOBAL TRADE
by 7-dimension
Seaport Type*
Seaport Size**
% US Foreign
factor__________________(3-cluster model)__(millions of TEUs)_Waterborne TEUs
New York
Primary
2.36
13.0%
Load Center
Los Angeles
Primary
6.62
36.5
Load Center
Chicago
Small, Misc.
0.03
0.1
Boston
San Francisco/Oakland
Washington DC
Miami
Philadelphia
8 Global Cities

Small, Container

0.06

0.1

Secondary
Load Center
-

0.96

5.3

-

-

Secondary
Load Center
Secondary
Load Center
-

.72

4.0

.27

1.5

11.02

61.0%

Total Foreign
Containerized cargo
18.12
100.0%
* Cluster Categories determined by a K-means 3-cluster method.
**Measured by the number of “twenty-foot-equivalent units” (TEUs) transshipped at a
seaport which are large 8 foot by 8 foot salt-resistant metal containers ranging in length
from 20 to 52 feet. Only foreign trade is included.
Source: Port Import Export Reporting Service (2001), “U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade:
Total Containerized Cargo” (Washington, DC: Maritime Administration).
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FIGURE 3
AN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS GENRE AND MOBILITY PRESSURES
53 U.S. Cities: Correlations (r sq) Using 2000 Data
U P P E R M I D D L E C L A S S A C T I V I T I E S*
MOBILITY
Command-Center Institutional Entertainment
PRESSURES
Employment
Research Consumption
Transit Consumption (per capita)
.79
.69
.58
Urban Traffic Congestion

.50

.42

.54

International Airport passengers
.76
.42
.84
* Indicators for these activity types are three of the seven dimensions that make up the
global-city factor. Correlations are significant at the .01 level using a 2-tailed method.
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FIGURE 4
DISPROPORTIONAL MOBILITY IMPACTS OF UMC ON GLOBAL CITIES
53 U.S. Cities: K-Means Cluster Analysis, 2000 Data
INCLUDED IN HIGHEST MOBILITY CLUSTER FOR:
Transit Consumption Traffic Congestion International
GLOBAL CITY
(cluster size = 7)
(cluster size = 15)
Air Travel*
(Rank Order)_________________________________________________ (cluster size: 14)
New York
X
NO
X
Los Angeles

NO

X

X

Chicago

X

X

X

Boston

X

X

X

San Francisco/Oakland

X

X

X

Washington, DC

X

X

X

Miami

NO

X

X

Philadelphia

X

NO

X

NO = Global City not in highest mobility cluster.
*Measured as the percent of total U.S. international travelers passing through the city’s
airport.
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FIGURE 5
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FIGURE 6

A BI-LEVEL POLICYMAKING STRUCTURE
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

LEVEL 1
Collective
GlobalCities
Policy
Research

FEDERAL INTER-SILO POLICY RESEARCH AND CLEARINGHOUSE PANEL ON GLOBAL CITIES AS COASTAL CITIES
_____________________________________________________
SYSTEMIC RESEARCH ON
ON DUAL SUSTAINABILITY

•

CLEARINGHOUSE AND BROKERAGE
FOR INFORMATION INTEGRATION

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

_________________________________________________________________________

•

NY

LEVEL 2
Individual
GlobalCities
Systemic
Authorities

CITY-SPECIFIC FEDERAL DISTRICT AUTHORITIES WITH
CROSS-SILO AUTHORITY FOR URBAN SYSTEMIC POLICIES:
DIRECT FEDERALLY SUBVENTED FUNDS TO GLOBAL CITY

LA

CHI

BOS

SF/OAK

WASH DC

MIAMI

PHILLY
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